Wilfred Burchett on Portugal by Robertson, Mavis
WILFRED BURCHETT 
ON 
PORTUGAL
Since the end of April 1974, Wilfred Burchett has spent much of his time in Portugal reporting 
on political developments in that country. He is presently writing a book on his experiences.
Burchett gave this interview to Mavis Robertson in November 1974.
What were the social conditions 
which led to the changes in Portugal? 
In this context, could you comment on 
the following:
(a) The pressure of the movement for 
liberation in the colonies
(b) The position of women, e.g. as in 
the case of “ The Three Marias”
(c) Other causes particularly the 
position of the working class.
At the end of almost 50 years of fascist 
dictatorship the social conditions in 
Portugal were conditioned by a corrupt, 
inefficient regime which maintained itself 
in power by the terrorist organs of state 
repression - symbolised by the hated PIDE 
(secret police). Inflation was running at 
not less than 30 per cent by 1973-74. A 
feudal type agriculture, with vast landed 
estates of absentee landlords in the South 
and pocket handkerchief plots of the 
small-holders in the North, made life on 
the land impossible. It was this that forced 
hundreds of thousands of farm workers to 
migrate - a total of 1,500,000 Portuguese 
were working abroad by early 1974; the 
population of Portugal itself had
remained stagnant at about 9 million for 
the previous 10 years. Remittances of 
migrant earnings to their families 
provided Portugal’s major foreign 
exchange earnings. A secondary reason 
for migration was that of young people 
seeking to evade military service.
Industry was also highly inefficient. 
Salazar’s original policy had been to block 
the development of industry on the 
grounds that it would create an industrial 
proletariat and this would create 
communists. It was only after World War 
II that he was forced to permit a certain 
amount of development by monopolies 
protected from internal and external 
competition by the fascist regime. Three of 
the biggest of the monopolies were the 
CUF, concentrating on the main branches 
of heavy industry - steel, cement, electric 
power, ship building, heavy engineering, 
etc.; Champalimaud on medium and light 
industry and Banco Espirito Santo 
(literally, the Bank of the Holy Ghost) 
concentrating on banking. Naturally all 
three exploited the African colonies. They 
were protected from inside competition 
because they had an exclusive charter in
3
their own field, from outside competition 
by high tarrifs; from labor troubles by the 
repressive organs of the fascist state.
The Ministry of Labor, for instance, was 
a 95 per cent police organisation engaged 
in trying to locate any “ agitators” who 
sought to protect the workers’ interests 
and handing the dossiers over to PIDE for 
action. Apart from local industry, the 
Caetano regime which followed that of 
Salazar opened the doors to the 
multinationals - American, West German, 
British, French, Swedish, Italian and 
other firms to establish plants in Portugal 
for the exploitation of the country’s cheap 
labor. These plants contributed virtually 
nothing to the economy and were mainly 
engaged in assembling parts imported 
from abroad, the finished products then 
being exported. The technology remained 
en tire ly  in the hands o f  the 
multinationals, workers did simple, 
repetitive assembly jobs, learning 
nothing which could be of use to local 
industry.
The situation of women was incredibly 
terrible. They had no rights whatsoever. 
They were doubly and trebly oppressed. It 
was entirely a male world, grounds for 
divorce, for example, being if a wife 
attended confession without the 
permission of her husband. The husband 
was the arbiter in all questions. Women 
had no right to vote - even in the phoney 
elections that took place from time to time. 
Their wages for doing the same work as 
men were usually about half. Women were 
forced to work in the factories and fields to 
fend off starvation, but there were no 
creches, nurseries, and practically no 
schools in the countryside for their 
children. There was a very high infant 
mortality rate due to lack of mid-wives, 
medical facilities, and a high rate of 
accidents to children at home (through 
fires) and on the roads from automobiles 
because the children were left at home, 
unguarded, while their parents worked. 
But the fact that women were alongside 
their menfolk in factory and field 
developed a great spirit of militancy 
among Portuguese women which I felt 
from the moment (April 25) when I set foot 
in the country. It is no accident that the
m ost p u b lic ised  m artyr am ong 
progressive circles is the young peasant 
woman Caterina Eufemia, shot down as 
she headed a group o f striking 
agricultural workers in the South in an 
earlier phase of the struggle against 
fascism.
Wherever I went, in factories and farms, 
and among the sardine fishermen at 
Peniche, local progressive men spoke of 
the role of women in supporting strike 
actions and in the front ranks battling 
with the police. The case of “ The Three 
Marias” , in their literary protest 
(“ pornographic” in the eyes o f the fascist 
law) against the total suppression of 
women’s rights in every field, including 
sexuality, was symbolic of the generalised 
spirit of revolt among women and was one 
of the indicators that the country was ripe
- if not for revolt - at least to support any 
move to overthrow the regime.
Despite the great difficulties and 
penalties for militancy, the Portuguese 
working class, and particularly the illegal 
Communist Party, never ceased 
struggling for better conditions. The April 
25 coup caught the country in a wave of 
strikes - including among the sardine 
fishermen at Peniche and the excellent 
organisation and working class solidarity 
became apparent with the mighty May 
Day celebrations six days after the coup.
How much of the working class was 
in immigration? Have they now 
returned in large numbers?
There are 800,000 Portuguese in France 
alone. They are mostly from the land and 
have been recycled into industry - often 
the building trade. Official policy is not to 
encourage their return at this stage. With 
swiftly rising unemployment at home - 
due mainly to economic sabotage by the 
le a d in g  m o n o p o l ie s  an d  the 
multinationals - plus the necessity of re­
absorbing demobilised troops returning 
from the colonies - it is considered better to 
leave the migrants where they are. At 
least they have jobs and their remittances 
are a precious source of foreign exchange. 
A couple of months ago, tens of thousands
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of them, in an organised action, returned 
to have a look and there was a mass 
meeting o f about 100,000 in Lisbon 
addressed by premier Goncalves. There 
was fantastic enthusiasm and it was clear 
the migrants thoroughly approved what 
had happened.
The gainfully employed in Portugal are 
divided almost equally into three groups - 
agriculture, industry, trade and 
commerce.
What triggered off the change?
Profound dissatisfaction with the 
regime and recognition that the colonial 
wars were a major factor in the social- 
econom ic co n d it io n s  at h om e. 
Demoralisation within armed forces, 
despised at home and among the whites in 
the colonies for their failure to win the 
African wars. A growing conviction 
within the Armed Forces that the armed 
struggle was completely hopeless and that 
there was no military solution.
The precise event which transformed 
dissatisfaction into action and finally led 
to the coup was the promulgation o f a 
decree in July 1973 which offended the 
prestige of the officers’ corps. Due to 
battlefield losses and the general erosion 
in the officers’ corps, the Defence Ministry 
decreed that university graduates could 
take a six months’ crash course in military 
training and become officers with the 
same ranks, grades and privileges, long- 
service benefits, etc. as those who had 
done four years’ service in the field.
It was this that provoked the first 
meeting of officers in Lisbon - and in 
Guinea-Bissau - to discuss the situation. 
At first they had thought it would be 
sufficient to demand a repeal of the decree 
and the Caetano government would see 
the light. The result was PIDE action to 
try to discover the ring-leaders and to 
transfer some officers away from Lisbon. 
There were some purely titular changes at 
the top, but nothing else. The young 
officers - almost exclusively captains - 
decided to discuss furtaer. Discussions led 
to the whole question of the African wars, 
and eventually to the nature of the regime
which continued such senseless 
adventures. Finally, the conclusion was 
reached that the only way to change such 
a regime was to topple it by military force. 
The decision to stage a coup was taken in 
December 1973 after a step-by-step 
analysis and discussion on all available 
options.
An important factor in all this was the 
gradual change in the class composition 
of the officers’ corps. Until the African 
wars started it was the exclusive upper 
class who sent their sons - at least one son - 
into the army. It was all glitter and braid 
and soft jobs in the colonies, etc. But when 
soldiering became an unpleasant and 
dangerous business, the upper crust found 
other jobs for their offspring. The social 
levels were lowered and it was the sons of 
the petit-bourgeoisie, even in some cases 
the working class - who entered the 
military academy. By the time the 
officers’ discussions had started there was 
a sharp class differentiation between 
those of up to captain’s rank and those 
with the rank of colonels and above - with 
a few majors closer to to the captains than 
to the colonels.
Within the armed forces, at all levels 
and in all three branches, there were 
communist organisations. This had been 
true from the 1930s. Sometimes these 
organisations, or part of them were 
uncovered and leaders arrested, but they 
were never uprooted. In the discussions 
which led to the decision to carry out a 
coup, it can be taken for granted that 
communist party members payed a role. 
The Program of the 8th Congress of the 
Communist Party in 1964 includes a 
passage to the effect that given the nature 
of the fascist regime, it could only be 
overthrown by armed insurrection in 
which part of the armed forces would 
participate and other parts would be 
neutralised.
It is logical to assume that from that 
time on the communist party worked to 
bring about precisely the sort of situation 
as erupted on April 25, 1974.
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So what about the PCP - its work as 
an illegal organisation in the army, 
workplaces, rural areas - how did it 
exercise leadership from abroad?
In 1941 there was a big reorganisation 
of the PCP - in personnel, strategy and 
tactics. It was decided to organise a 
nucleus of clandestine, professional, full­
time revolutionaries. There is here a 
distinction between illegal and 
clandestine. Clandestine members 
changed their names, often wore disguise, 
abandoned their families and their jobs, 
moved from place to place - in homes of 
trusted illegal workers who did not even 
know their true identity - and organised 
struggle against the regime at virtually 
every level - including among the 
intellectuals. When the first meeting of the 
Central Committee was held after April 
25, it was calculated that those attending 
represented 240 years of prison and over 
700 years of clandestine activity. One 
cannot say that the leadership was 
exercised from abroad. It was exercised 
from within the country - sometimes 
directly from the prisons. After secretary- 
general Alvaro Cunhal went into exile, he 
returned on several occasions to attend 
secret congresses, etc. I have met Central 
Committee members who spent between 
15 and 21 years each in jail, but their 
activities as organisers never ceased 
during their prison terms.
It is said that the PCP is a pro- 
Soviet party and some claim that this 
is the source of its “ conservatism” . Is 
there any basis in such comments?
I consider the PCP is a party which, 
above all, has devoted itself to solving 
national problems in an original, 
revolutionary and national way. Under 
the most tremendous difficulties - cut off 
physically - from any contact with the 
international communist movement - 
except for those in exile - the PCP from 
1941 on w ards had en gaged  in 
revolutionary struggle with one aim - the 
overthrow of the fascist regime by armed 
insurrection. The step by step process 
which led to the April 25 coup had been 
followed by a step by step process since 
which has consolidated the alliance
between the armed forces and the 
progressive forces, and is also part of an 
accelerated process according to a 
carefully formulated program which has 
socialism at the end of the road. My 
strongest impression is that the PCP is 
first and foremost a pro-Portuguese party, 
sticking to its aims with enormous 
sacrifices and with very far-sighted 
leadership. In many ways I am reminded 
of the Vietnamese Lao Dong Party when I 
am in Portugal.
When one considers the enormous 
difficulties and sacrifices that the NLF of 
South Vietnam had to overcome to get 
arms in their hands - using hoes, clubs, 
and picks - to wrest arms from the hands 
of the enemy, the success of the PCP policy 
in surfacing with a large proportion of the 
country’s armed forces siding with the 
country’s progressive forces, one can give 
due value to the correct, long-range tactics 
o f the PCP.
In this context, it has been 
reported that the PCP has opposed 
strikes. Can you comment?
The PCP has opposed some strikes. 
These were strikes in the sectors of public 
transport, the PTT, and bread-baking 
industry . It has a lso  opposed  
unrealistically high wage demands.
From April 25 onwards there have been 
three m ajor cou n ter-a tta ck s by 
Portuguese reaction. The first was around 
the end of May, beginning of June. This 
was the economic attack on a pattern 
surprisingly similar to what happened in 
Chile, as part of the “softening up” 
process to overthrow the Allende regime. 
It is now public knowledge that the CIA 
was behind this. In Portugal, millions of 
dollars were paid out in support of strikes 
in the transport sector. From the very first 
days of the coup some o f the big 
monopolies and the multinationals 
(including ITT of notoriety in the Chilean 
affair) suddenly started offering very big 
wage increases whereas before they had 
been refusing to honor even the modest 
wage contracts negotiated during the 
Caetano regime. This had a three-fold aim
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- (a) to accelerate the process of 
swallowing up the medium and small 
enterprises by setting wage levels that the 
small and medium enterprises could not 
possibly pay; (b) creating mass 
unemployment by forcing the medium 
and small enterprises to close down, thus 
contributing to economic chaos; (c) by 
setting abnormally high wage levels the 
monopolies hoped to provoke a wave of 
strikes as workers strove to attain the 
high levels suddenly offered by the 
monopolies.
PCP policy was in line with that of the 
Armed Forces program which provided 
that the conditions of the “ under­
privileged” should be speedily alleviated. 
The PCP supported the proposal to set a 
minimum basic wage - set at 3,300 escudos 
per month on a basis of equal pay for equal 
work. This was adopted and immediately 
resulted in doubling the wages of over half 
of all employed. The overwhelming 
majority of workers quickly saw through 
the tactics of the monopolies. The trade 
unions, supported by the PCP staged a 
huge demonstration on the first Saturday 
in June calling for a halt to “ wild-cat” 
strikes, under the main slogan: “ No 
Strikes for the Sake of Strikes” . In 
general, that demonstration ended that 
phase of the counter-attack on the 
economic front.
The policy of the fascists was to create 
the sort of economic chaos that would 
force intervention of the armed forces 
against the people. PCP policy was to 
preserve the unity between the Armed 
Forces Movement and the people.
The second counter-offensive was the 
government crisis in early July. 
Conservative prime minister Carlos 
Palmas threatened to resign unless the 
question of elections was more or less 
indefinitely postponed; that President 
Spinola was appointed virtually 
indefinitely heading a sort of presidential 
regime with increased powers and that 
parts of the AFM Program was shelved. 
(Essentially the AFM Program provided 
for the dismantling of the fascist 
structure; an end to the African wars; the 
creation of conditions under which 
democratic elections could be held by 
March 31, 1975.)
Carlos Palmas eventually had little 
support and was allowed to resign. 
Spinola wanted to appoint one of his own 
men, former defence minister Major 
Firmino Miguel, as prime minister. But he 
had played no role in the April 25 coup. 
The AFM rejected him and insisted on 
appointing their own man, Lt. Colonel 
Vasco Goncalves who had supported the 
AFM from the beginning. (Spinola 
referred to him as “ that communist 
Goncalves” .) On the day that Goncalves 
was appointed, another decisively 
important thing took place. That was the 
setting up of COPCON, a special military 
command for territorial Portugal charged 
with ensuring the strict application of the 
AFM Program. In fact it was a sort of 
anti-coup command. Heading it was 
General Costa Gomes, the highly 
respected former chief of general staff, 
sacked by Caetano in the last days of the 
latter’s regime, reappointed after the April 
25 coup. Deputy Chief was a major (moved 
up to brigadier for his new appointment) 
Saraino de Carvalho who had been the 
technical military brain in organising 
and carrying out the April 25 coup. 
Saraino de Carvalho was also appointed 
commander of the Lisbon Command. The 
“captains” were beginning to see what 
they were up against and took measures 
accordingly. The July crisis resulted in 
the elimination of rightist forces from the 
government, the entry of members of the 
AFM  in to  the g overn m en t, a 
consolidation of unity between the AFM 
and the progressive forces.
The third counter-offensive, and by far 
the most important, was in the second 
week of September. Under the pretext of 
organising a monster rally in Lisbon to 
support Spinola and denounce the “ forces 
of totalitarian extremism” , a military 
coup was prepared. The intended rally 
was to be used as a cover to smuggle 
assault forces and great quantities of 
arms into Lisbon and stage a fascist 
restoration.
Without going into detail, this plot was 
thwarted by the mobilisation of the 
masses and the unity and solidarity 
between the people and the armed forces.
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At least 100,000 people worked shoulder- 
to-shoulder with the armed forces in 
erecting barricades all over the country - 
blocking off all movement from the major 
centres and at the approaches to Lisbon. 
They searched and found arms which 
were then distributed among the activists. 
Spinola tried to call out troops he thought 
would be loyal to him, but apart from a 
couple of hundred parachutists, they 
refused to move without specific orders 
from COPCON. At a critical moment, 
Spinola thought he had decapitated 
COPCON by holding Coste Gomes and 
Saraivo de Carvalho incommunicado 
under virtual arrest - together with prime 
minister Goncalves. But COPCON went 
into action. It reoccupied the radio and TV 
stations seized by Spinolas men and raced 
to the Lisbon barricades. It was here that 
the question of civil war was averted, the 
COPCON men reasoned with the 
parachutists, explaining the real 
situation. The parachutists decided to 
withdraw and leave the field in the hands 
of COPCON. (All this took place on the 
night o f September 11 -12.) The rally was 
called off - it had been physically stopped 
at the barricades in any case. Two days 
later, Spinola resigned and three of his 
supporters in the seven-member Military 
Junta o f National Salvation were forced 
to resign and the remaining Spinola 
supporters within the cabinet were kicked 
out, including defence minister Firmino 
Miguel. The third counter-attack resulted 
in further consolidation of the unity 
between the AFM and the progressive 
forces.
What is the present perspective of 
the PCP? What is its strategy for 
socialism?
Front” or “ National Front” alliance, but 
favored a “ Democratic Front” within 
which the maximum of anti-fascist 
democratic forces could be mobilised. The 
PCP felt also that the AFM should now be 
considered as a political movement. Its 
Program is essentially a political 
program. More and more the AFM - which 
now represents virtually all the armed 
forces in the country - has played a 
political role, even an administrative role 
and has earned the right to play a leading 
role in the political life of the country.
The AFM Program provides for 
restricting the economic powers of the 
monopolies and as the monopolies were 
clearly implicated in the attempted 
September counter-coup, it is certain that 
their wings are going to be clipped. The 
PCP supports the idea for creating 
conditions for a democratic choice at the 
forthcoming elections and believes that 
the progressive forces have nothing to lose 
from an electoral confrontation. No 
fundamental changes in the social- 
economic structure can take place before 
there is an elected government - this is 
incribed in the AFM Program. An elected 
government, the PCP considers, will 
provide the base to push ahead towards 
socialism in a form suitable to the concrete 
situation in Portugal. The PCP attaches 
great importance to supporting the small 
and medium enterprises against the 
monopolies; the small and medium land­
holders against the absentee landlords. 
But to push ahead giving primacy to 
slogans about socialism in a country 
where the entire population has been 
brain-washed with anti-communist 
propaganda for half a century is not 
considered good tactics at the moment.
At this stage, the step by step process is 
to prevent the return of fascism, and 
pursue a national-democratic policy - a 
policy under which the maximum of anti­
fascist, democratic forces can be 
mobilised and unity with the armed forces 
maintained and strengthened.
At the time [ left Portugal, following the 
September crisis, the electoral law had not 
been approved, so PCP strategy for March 
1975 elections could not be defined. I was 
told that the PCP was against a “ Popular
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A variety of left groups exist. What 
is their strength, their programs, 
their relations with the PCP, their 
prospects?
Over 60 political parties sprang into life 
within weeks of the April 25 coup. Among 
them, 12 or 15 “ leftist groups” . These 
included three or four trotskyist groups, 
three or four so-called “maoist” groups. 
Virtually all o f them highly critical of the 
PCP for its “ revisionist” or “ reformist” 
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line. These groups are very active in 
Lisbon, mainly restricted, as far as 
support is concerned, to the student 
community and in certain enterprises 
where the work force is predominantly 
“white collar” . Most of them have not as 
yet published their programs. There have 
been various conferences at which some of 
the groups have tried to establish a 
“united revolutionary” movement, but up 
to the time I left, this had not resulted in 
anything concrete. As far as I could 
ascertain, these groups have no roots 
among the main working class 
organisations, nor among the peasantry. 
They have some influence among 
intellectuals but nothing compared to the 
influence of the PCP. Many of the 
adherents of these groups are devoted, 
sincere activists, very courageous - their 
analyses of the situation are often 
theoretically justified. But if they are 
strong in revolutionary theory they are 
weak in tactics, organisation and, above 
all, in experience. They tend to see 
problems in isolation from the overall 
situation, partially and not wholly.
PCP veterans take a tolerant attitude 
towards these parties and groups. They 
explain that their appearance on the 
scene is partly a reaction to the terribly 
authoritarian pattern of feudal family 
relations. Their revolutionary fervor 
against the old society can also be 
explained in those terms. Until the 
September crisis, there were virtually no 
relations at all between them and the PCP
- except in the case of combating some of 
the wildest of the strikes. But when the 
call went out to build and man the 
barricades, many members of these 
parties came to the headquarters of the 
PCP and the MDP (Portuguese 
Democratic Movement supported by the 
PCP, the Socialist Party and other anti­
fascist groups and individuals) and asked 
for guidance. They offered to work 
wherever the PCP decided they were 
needed and to do whatever was needed. 
They were among the most effective 
workers, and their services during this 
first effort at “ unity of action” may pave 
the way for a drawing together of all anti­
fascist forces. This is the concept of the 
PCP.
Is there any discussion of, and 
practice of, the concept of workers’ 
control?
There have been instances where 
factories have been abandoned because, 
with the doubling of the minimum wage, 
the cheap labor power on which these 
factories were based was beginning to cost 
twice as much. In several such cases - 
tailoring businesses for instance - the 
workers have taken over and have run the 
factories themselves. These are only a few 
isolated instances. They could form a 
nucleus of a much broader movement if 
the monopolies or multi-nationals start 
abandoning their enterprises. I do not 
believe the PCP is pushing for workers’ 
control at this stage. It could alienate the 
small and medium enterprises and have a 
bad effect on the type of anti-fascist 
national unity which the PCP strives to 
foster.
How would you describe mass 
ideology towards (a) former colonies;
(b) socialism?
On the first question, there is almost a 
total mass opposition to the continuance 
of the African wars. In my travels and 
interviews I did not find a single person 
who was not in favor of ending the 
A frican wars even where people 
considered this meant total and complete 
defeat. The continuance of these wars is so 
clearly linked with the social and 
economic ills at home that mass 
opposition is total. This is so even in the 
most backward areas of the country - 
among the peasant small-holders in the 
North. After all, it is their sons who are 
taken off into military service. Even if 
they are not wounded or disease-ridden, 
when they return from the wars they no 
longer want to go back to their old homes 
and villages. They have a taste for “ urban 
life” , the “ bright lights” , and no longer 
want to return to the mediaeval, feudal 
conditions of the villages. The soldiers 
have no sympathy with the white settlers 
who accuse them of cowardice, 
inefficiency, failure to win the colonial 
wars. Even in the smallest villages in the 
most backward - ideologically - parts of 
the country there were slogans on the 
walls calling for an end to the wars in
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Africa.
In respect to support for socialism, 
attitudes are developing among the 
agricultural laborers in the southern part 
of the country; many are expressing the 
idea that the absentee landlord estates 
should be taken over by the state and 
made into state farms. Even in the north, 
one heard many expressions of interest in 
co-operative farming. The property of the 
small-holders is always dispersed, 
because of the splitting up which occurs at 
the time of marriage, inheritance, etc. 
People with four or five acres may have up 
to 15 or 20 different plots of land. 
Sometimes they even share olive trees 
with a neighbour. So the idea of pooling 
these dispersed plots and pooling funds to 
buy a tractor and work the land more 
efficiently is becoming widespread even in 
the most reactionary areas of the country.
Among the working class, I believe the 
idea of a socialist system is gaining 
ground and this concept will undoubtedly 
have been given an impetus because of the 
exposure of the role of the monopolies in 
the counter-revolutionary attempted coup 
in September. Nineteen members of the 
Espirito Santo banking family fled to 
Madrid when the coup was thwarted, a 
member of the Champalimaud family (the 
second largest monopoly) was amongst 
those arrested. The Armed Forces 
Program provides for curbing the power of 
the monopolies. The idea of the state 
taking over such monopolies would be 
highly popular among the working class 
and progressive intellectuals. But the idea 
is not being pushed at this moment in the 
same general interest of mobilising the 
broadest possible mass of public opinion, 
preventing a fascist comeback, and 
enabling the electoral confrontation by 
the end of March 1975. It is felt that the 
progressive forces will have a clearer 
mandate after those elections. The PCP 
wants to be able to take the Armed Forces 
Movement with them in every step along 
the road to a national democratic 
revolution.
One of Portugal’s colonies is 
Portuguese Timor. Is anyone in 
Portugal conscious of this? Is there 
any program for Timor?
Yes, people are conscious o f Timor, as 
they are of Macao and other small pockets 
of Portuguese rule. Obviously as there is 
no fighting going on there and large 
numbers of troops are not involved, it is a 
question of secondary importance. The 
government - before the September crisis - 
did make a general statement that 
Portugal was now ready to accept various 
UN resolutions on the colonial question 
and grant self-determination to all the 
overseas territories. (This was contained 
in a statement made by Spinola at the 
insistence of the Armed Forces Movement 
last July.) On the decolonisation front, 
policy has been to settle the easiest one - 
Guinea-Bissau - first, with the idea that 
this would facilitate a settlement of the 
next easiest - Mozambique. It was hoped 
that the settlement of Mozambique would 
facilitate a settlement in the much more 
complicated problem of Angola. After 
these three major problems were settled, 
the settlement of territories where there 
has not been armed conflict would be 
tackled.
Could you say how the PCP views 
the in tern a tio n a l com m unist 
movement, in particular their views 
on the Soviet Union and China, and 
their relations with the CP of Spain?
My impression was that the PCP is so 
involved in the clear and pressing dangers 
of avoiding a fascist comeback and the 
organisation of all those progressive 
forces inside the country that can be 
organised, that the international 
movement seems very remote. References 
to the CPSU in the PCP press are more 
frequent than references to the CP of 
China. In general, I found a great 
curiosity as to what is going on inside 
China, matched with very scant 
knowledge. Relations with the CP of 
Spain, as far as I could discern, are very 
close indeed.
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